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ABSTRACT 
It is especially difficult for seed stage companies to find 
adequate financing. In the last decade venture capital 
(VC) has played significant role in funding seed and 
start-up stage companies. Our study focuses on the 
financing of seed stage companies via venture capital 
funds subsidized by the state and European Union. Seed 
stage companies are supported by incubator houses with 
infrastructure and expertise. Accelerators help them 
with their partner network, with intensive training and 
occasionally with capital. There is no sharp borderline 
between incubator houses and accelerators regarding the 
provided services. We give an overview about the 
history of the Hungarian VC market with its most 
important milestones. In our study, we pay extra 
attention to the appearance of the governmental and the 
EU funds, and focus on the model of the local VC 
market, presenting how funds operate and distribute 
state subsidies. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many authors have researched various aspects of state 
involvement on venture capital market. One of the most 
comprehensive books is written by Gompers and Lerner 
(2004), which presents systematically how venture 
capital industry works in the United States. They 
examined conditions and circumstances under 
governments can efficiently act as venture capitalists. 
They concluded that governments should help in the 
financing of small companies as it generates a positive 
social effect. This conclusion is supported also by other 
researchers (Harding, 2000; Sohl, 1999). Lerner (1999) 
examined the long-term effects of US venture capital 
programs called “Small Business Innovation Research” 
(SBIR). This program has run from 1983 to 2003 and 
had distributed 13 billion dollars to small high-
technology firms.  
The OECD survey (1997) categorized government 
programs as follows: 1) providing sources to invest in 
small companies, 2) providing financial incentives for 
investing in small companies and 3) regulations for 
venture capitalists. Government venture capital schemes 
intend to capture public benefits in terms of increased 
innovation, economic growth and job creation. 
According to EU financial market policies the role of 
venture capital finance is to facilitate employment and 
improvement in productivity (Schelter, 2006). Garbade 
(2011) did a comparative analysis of venture capital 
financing by U.S., British, German and French 
Information Technology Start-ups The EU also started 
it’s own venture capital program called Jeremie, which 
we will examine in the upcoming chapters regarding the 
Hungarian market.  
Many researches were published concerning Hungarian 
venture capital market and financing. Most relevant 
publications are presented briefly later in that article. In 
the upcoming chapters, we present the model of the 
European Union and the state involvement in the 
Hungarian venture capital financing. 
MODEL OF THE VENTURE CAPITAL MARKET 
IN HUNGARY 
The most important actors of the Hungarian venture 
capital market are displayed on Figure 1. The target 
companies can be distinguished based on three stages of 
their business development: seed, start-up and 
expanding enterprises. We are going to focus on seed 
stage enterprises that can be supported by incubator 
houses or accelerators. There is no sharp borderline 
between the two types supporting entities. The 
Vállalkozói Inkubátorok Szövetsége (VISZ - Association 
of Entrepreneurial Incubators) gives all its support 
market participants to found more entrepreneur 
incubators.  
Other groups of important actors are the venture capital 
fund management and the capital funds. The Hungarian 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(HVCA) represents the interests of the whole private 
equity and venture capital sector in Hungary. Its mission 
is to support its members and promote adherence to the 
highest possible professional and ethical standards. 
Another important actor is the Central Bank of Hungary 
(CBH – in Hung. Magyar Nemzeti Bank; MNB) who 
plays a supervisory role. Until the year 2013 the 
supervision was performed by the “Pénzügyi 
Szervezetek Állami Felügyelete” (Financial Supervisory 
Authority), which merged with the CBH. 
On the one hand, governmental participation appears in 
the foundation of venture capital fund managements on 
the other hand in subsidizing funds. The EU 
involvement manifests by providing financial sources, 
distributed via tenders. The tenders of the EU funds are 
coordinated by the Hungarian Development Bank Plc. 
(HDB). Earlier this task was performed by the Magyar 
Vállalkozásfinanszírozási Zrt. (Hungarian Business 
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Financing Plc) which was merged into HDB in 2015. 
All the plans containing state subsidy in terms of EU 
regulation must be announced to the authority of the 
State Aid Monitoring Office (SAMO). It is responsible 
for examining competition regulatory aspects of state 
subsidies. As a rule, state subsidy is banned in the EU as 
it distorts market competition. The state can intervene 
only if there are market failures in a segment. 
Figure 1: The most important actors of the Hungarian venture capital market in 2016 
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF STARTER 
COMPANIES AND THEIR TYPICAL 
FINANCING  
Financial sources for starter enterprises according to 
different stages of their life-cycle are as follows: 
• The “seed stage enterprises” often possess merely
the product/service idea ("idea company"). Investors
of these companies are usually business angels, seed
funds, accelerators, or the 3F (Family, Friends,
Fools).
• “Start-up enterprises” already developed an
operating prototype and have some market response
on the product or service. These enterprises are
beloved targets of venture capital funds.
• The “expansion stage enterprises” have an
established business but need additional financing to
expand further on the market (marketing expenses,
and to cover the initial losses). Venture capital funds
and private equity investors are the typical investors
of these companies.
In these early stages the enterprises cannot count on 
bank loans. But as we see venture capital funds are 
present in each of the three stages, emerging in several 
forms (Walter, 2014a).  
One typical problem of starter enterprises is the lack of 
an economic/financial expertise to set up a business plan 
to present to potential investors. On the other hand, it is 
hard for starter companies to set up a feasible business 
plan, because the operation, business model has not 
evolved completely yet. Furthermore, the 
product/service creates in many cases a "blue ocean" in 
the sector. As there are no competition and benchmark 
in this case, so business plan should focus on how 
customers could be convinced. Good examples from 
such innovations from the near past are: "pick pack 
point" that is widespread package sending method by 
now; the smartphone; the smartwatch; virtual reality 
headsets. Not only is the forecasting of revenues 
difficult in such cases but the estimation of costs also. 
Incubator houses and accelerators 
On the Hungarian market there is always confusion in 
distinguishing incubator houses and accelerators in their 
name and also in their provided services.  
Incubator houses do not invest, they just provide 
professional business support and infrastructure – e.g. 
office space, office and business related services – to 
start-ups on a favorable price in the growth stage of 
development. In Hungary, the Vállalkozói Inkubátorok 
Szövetsége coordinates the main traditional incubator 
houses: 
• Közép-dunántúli Regionális Innovációs Ügynökség
Nonprofit Kft.
• Primom Vállalkozói Inkubátorház és Innovációs
Központ
• Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Innovációs Ügynökség
Nonprofit Kft.
• Fnix Inkubátorház és Üzleti Központ
• Budapesti Politechnikum Alapítvány
• Bács-Kiskun Megyei Angol-Magyar Kisvállalkozási
Alapítvány
• Vállalkozói Központ Közalapítvány, Székesfehérvár
Accelerators support starter enterprises in implementing
their business idea. The starter entrepreneurs take part in
a training to develop the given business activity. The
program usually lasts for a couple of months.
Entrepreneurs can meet business mentors via the
business network of the accelerator, and establish their
presence in the given industry sector. Certain
accelerators – in return for a small equity share –
occasionally even provide capital for the start-up
company. It becomes common, that venture capital
investors establish accelerators to finance the most
promising enterprises from their own seed funds. An 
example for this is the SeedStar accelerator of DBH 
Investment Plc., which defines itself as an incubator 
house and as an accelerator. It organized the SeedStar 
Battle start-up competition in April, 2015, where the 
presenting starter enterprises were evaluated by a 
professional jury, moreover competitors had the 
opportunity to meet venture capital investors as well. 
 
VENTURE CAPITAL FUND MANAGEMENT 
AND FUNDS 
The VC fund management is legally separated from the 
fund it handles. The fund management collects liquid 
funds from different investors into the VC capital fund. 
The fund itself is without legal personality, and its role 
is to finance investments made by the capital fund 
management. One of the legal requirements for the 
establishment of a fund is the completion and 
authorization of the Management Guidelines. Among 
many conditions, it fixes the investment strategy, the 
target industry, the target development stage of the 
enterprises and also determines the expected return and 
investment tenor. Similarly, to the stages of 
development by start-up enterprises, we can 
differentiate “seed”, “start-up” and the “expansion 
funds” based on their investment strategy.  
The fund management charges a fund with management 
fee for their services. It mainly covers the cost of the 
operation of the fund management (infrastructure and 
employees). With the expiration of the fund’s lifetime 
the accumulated amount in the fund must be paid back 
to the investors. 
It is important to differentiate the expected return from 
a single investment and the expected return of a total 
fund. Table 1 shows the returns expected of a single 
investment by the US venture capital investors in 
different stages of development by the enterprises. 
Obviously, the expected return of a single investment is 
the highest at companies in the seed stage, where the 
chance of survival is the lowest. As the enterprise 
develops, the probability of survival becomes higher 
and the expected return of the investment decreases. 
 
Table 1: Expected returns in the United States 
 
Life cycle Expected returns of Venture Capital in the US 
Seed >80% 
Start-up 50-70% 
Expansion 1st round 40-60% 
Expansion 2nd round 30-50% 
Source: Sahlman-Scherlis (2003) 
 
While some of the investments produce great returns, 
several of them end up with a failure. That is why the 
expected return of one single investment is high, but 
realized return of the fund is much lower. (See Table 2 
in case of US venture capital funds). It can be seen that 
in the seed stage expected return if 80% for a single 
investment, while the realized three-year-long annual 
return was 4,9% and the biggest return was 32,9% 
during a ten-year-long interval.  
 
Table 2. Returns Earned by Venture Capitalists Looking 
Back from 2007 
 
Investor /  
index type 3 years 5 years 10 years  20 years 
Early/seed VC 4.90% 5.00% 32.90% 21.40% 
Balanced VC 10.80% 11.90% 14.40% 14.70% 
Later stage VC 12.40% 11.10% 8.50% 14.50% 
All VC 8.50% 8.80% 16.60% 16.90% 
Benchmarks:     
NASDAQ index 3.60% 7.00% 1.90% 9.20% 
S&P index 2.40% 5.50% 1.20% 8.00% 
Source: Damodaran (2009) 
 
Based on the numbers of the two tables we can state that 
the realized returns achieved by the venture capital fund 
are deeply under the expected returns of a single 
investment, but over the returns of some stock market 
indexes like NASDAQ index and the S&P index. 
On the Hungarian market Karsai (1997) estimates the 
expected return to 35-50% in 1997 and to 30-40% in 
2002. Estimations were made by interviews with 
venture capital investors active on the local market. We 
must mention that the state owned “Széchenyi 
Tkealap-kezel Zrt.” (Széchenyi Capital Fund 
Management Plc.) expects a return of 12% to 15% from 
its investments, which is much lower than the expected 
return of one single investment by other Hungarian or 
foreign fund managements. It must also be noted that 
this expected return range only applies to companies 
with at least 2 years of operating history at the 
Széchenyi Tkealap-kezel Zrt.  
 
Table 3: Composition of the capital for Venture Capital 
and Private Equity Investments  
 
Type of sponsors Proportion of total funds provided 
Government organizations 58,52% 
Banks 18,00% 
Private investors 10,48% 
Corporate investors 4,41% 
Other asset managers 3,86% 
Superannuation funds 1,39% 
Family asset managers 1,33% 
Other 1,08% 
Fund manager contributions 0,46% 
Academic institutions 0,40% 
Funds of funds 0,07% 
Source: MNB (2015) 
 Table 3. shows that the biggest investors are 
governmental institutions (58,52%). A great amount of 
EU resources was distributed to venture capital funds 
through the “Jeremie program” which we will detail 
later. 
Venture capital funds usually invest equity into starter 
or early phase enterprises as target companies. The 
maturity of investments is 5-7 years with exiting plan 
after the investment horizon. The main difference 
between venture capital and private equity is that private 
equity finances the enterprises that are already over the 
starting phase and enter the expansion stage. The target 
investments are typically very risky, the expected return 
of the investors is also high, and the realized return on 
the investments must compensate the losses produced 
by investments failed. 
 
Historical overview 
From the 1989 to 1992 the Hungarian market was 
dominated only by the so-called “country-funds”, the 
funds that invest in a defined country. This time 
privatization played a central role in the investments. 
The average size of these funds was around 50 million 
dollars. From 1992 the so-called “regional funds” 
entered the market too, who concentrated on the 
Central-Eastern-European region. The size of these 
funds reached the volume of 100 to 200 million dollars. 
Until about the year of 2000 the focus of investments 
was mainly on technological financing. In the early 
years of 2000 classic venture capital investors have also 
appeared who made their first investments into start-up 
companies (Karsai, 2011). From 2005 to 2008 the so-
called global funds have also launched their activity in 
Hungary.  
The Hungarian market was especially attractive for new 
investments after joining the EU. Working capital 
investments continuously increased until the crisis of 
2007. Between 2007 and 2009 the market gained some 
attractiveness even from the fact that the pace of 
Western-European investments became slower. By 2010 
the crisis heavily affected the Hungarian VC capital 
market as well, and the volume of investments 
decreased significantly (Karsai, 2012). 
In 2009 the Jeremie I. program was launched in 
Hungary. Sources were distributed among the funds in 
more stages through a tender system. The Jeremie 
program was founded by the European Committee 
together with the European Investment Fund. The 
program supported micro-, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises. This capital infusion gave a new impulse to 
the Hungarian venture capital investments. These days – 
partly due to the Jeremie program –, culture of start-up 
enterprises have become well known and accepted. 
The New Hungary Venture Capital Program (also called 
as Jeremie I) distributed funds between 8 winning 
venture capital funds and their management companies. 
The total volume of these funds was about 48 bn HUF 
with at least 30% private sector investment and with a 
maximum of 70% state involvement in each fund. The 
size of the smallest and the largest fund was 4 bn HUF 
and 7,36 bn HUF respectively (MV Zrt., 2013).  
The Hungarian state provided 27 billion HUF equity to 
local venture capital investors in 2012. Main sources 
came from the European Regional Development Fund 
in the framework of the New Széchenyi Venture Capital 
Program - Economy Development Operative Program 4. 
This program was also called Jeremie II. program. In 
the program 6 billion HUF could be invested via the so 
called Common Seed Fund subprogram to finance 
micro- or SMEs established within 3 years with a 
maximum annual sales revenue of 200 million HUF. 
The funds could invest the remaining 22,5 billion HUF 
through the Common Growth Fund subprogram to 
micro companies, SMEs and to medium-sized 
companies established within 5 years with a maximum 
sales revenue of 5 billion HUF (Invitation to Tender, 
2012).  The total size of all the funds was 41 bn HUF, 
the size of the smallest fund was 2.14 bn HUF, and the 
largest fund received 6.5 bn HUF (MV Zrt. 2013). 
The subprogram of the Széchenyi Capital Program 
Common Growth Fund expanded further in several 
steps. In the stage named as Jeremie III. eight venture 
capital fund managements received 3 billion HUF each. 
(Project Result Proclamation, 2013). 
Several events and meeting opportunities are organized 
for the leaders of the start-up enterprises and potential 
investors. Such an event was the IVSZ Start-up 
Conference in the organization of the Informatikai, 
Távközlési és Elektronikai Vállalkozások Szövetsége 
(Association of IT, Communication and Electronical 
Enterprises) and the Start-up Underground Events, 
which was organized at the Corvinus University of 
Budapest in 2013. 
 
Seed capital funds today in Hungary 
Despite Sahlman-Scherlis (2003) who considers the 
seed funds primarily as investors who finance idea 
companies, investment guidelines of the seed companies 
in Hungary often ask for a prototype and market 
validation from the target companies. 
On Figure 2 the distribution of the venture capital funds 
is presented according to the lifecycles of the target 
companies. Between 2010 and 2014 the seed stage 
companies received 13,43% of total funds distributed. 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Venture Capital Investments 
According to Lifecycle between 2010 and 2014  
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Source: MNB (2015) 
 
The Hungarian accelerator called Traction Tribe set the 
objective to sell target companies to US venture capital 
investors, in other words to take them to the Silicon 
Valley, to one of the centers of starter companies. 
Between 2010 and 2015 39% of the US venture capital 
investments were executed in companies based in 
Silicon Valley (NVCA, 2016). Young start-up 
entrepreneurs come here from all over the world hoping 
that their idea will attract the investors' attention. As an 
example, iCatapult, a Hungarian Accredited 
Technological Incubator, also received a state subsidize. 
iCatapult also urges their supported start-up companies 
to build up US relations, to step onto the US market and 
contact US investors (Website of iCatapult). This is in 
strong contrast with the statement in the announcements 
of the National Research, Development and Innovation 
Office. Based on the statements, the goal of the program 
is to keep local start-up enterprises at home (NKFIH 
2015). 
 
STATE INVOLVEMENT ON THE VENTURE 
CAPITAL MARKET 
The state is present on the market both as a venture 
capital investor and as a venture capital management. 
On the one hand the state appears as an equity holder in 
the capital funds, on the other hand there are venture 
capital fund management companies in state possession 
that invest state and EU funds. State intervention into 
the market mechanisms is necessary anyway if market 
failures occur. Market failures indicate that market 
mechanisms cannot create optimal market (Kovácsné 
2011). These can appear in several forms and all can 
indicate market distortions: problems with public goods, 
presence of monopolistic and oligopolistic market 
participants, asymmetric information, transaction costs 
and externalities. (Lovas 2015). These latter three 
market failures are especially relevant from venture 
capital point of view. These failures are also responsible 
for the lack of financing for start-up companies, a 
typical market feature.  
• The problem of asymmetrical information is very 
much in focus since the publication of Ackerlof 
(1970). Ackerlof demonstrates this effect on the 
lemons market, which we can interpret as example 
for financing start-up enterprises. Only the 
entrepreneur has any kind of information concerning 
the risk of the enterprise, the investor can just guess 
it (Leland–Pyle 1977). As the investor takes the 
average when it determines the conditions of 
financing, and he sets conditions that are adequate 
for the "bad" enterprises and not for the good ones. 
These conditions include also the investor's expected 
return. The investor's expected return for good start-
up enterprises is too high, for the bad ones it is too 
favorable. In this case, the state can enter as the 
financer, as the expected return of one single 
investment of a state-owned capital fund manager is 
lower than the expected return of the private market 
capital funds. 
• The second market failure is related to the topic of 
transaction costs. Start-up enterprises searching for 
financing occasionally require too negligible 
amounts. These amounts are not economic from 
private VC investors’ point of view due to the 
relatively high transactional costs, administrative 
fees, and expert fees. For VC investors, it is not 
worth financing under a certain investment size (15 
to 20 million). However, state actors may 
accomplish investments under this threshold. 
• Finally, we also must mention externalities as a 
reason for market failures. State intervention on the 
venture capital market can stimulate local 
innovation, and social-economic development in a 
wider sense. It can follow more goals than pure 
profit goals, like the development of local, regional 
economy, job-creation, or increasing tax incomes as 
a fundamental base of social services. These can be 
translated as a positive externality that can justify 
state intervention. 
 
State owned venture capital fund management and 
their funds 
There were and there are many state-owned capital fund 
managers in Hungary during the last decade. The 
currently operating funds are as follows: Széchenyi 
Tkealap-kezel Zrt. (Széchenyi Capital Fund 
Management Plc.) manages the Széchenyi Tkealap 
(Széchenyi Capital Fund). In 2002 the Informatikai 
Kockázati Tkealap-kezel Zrt. (IT Venture Capital 
Fund Management Plc.) started to manage a fund of 3 
bn HUF. It was taken over by the Corvinus Tkealap-
kezel Zrt. (Corvinus Venture Capital Fund 
Management Plc.) in 2015. 
At the end of 2016 “Corvinus Tkealap-kezel Zrt.” 
was renamed to HiVenture Venture Capital Fund 
Management Plc. It is planned to manage state fund of 
50 bn HUF provided by the EU, in cooperation with the 
Hungarian Development Bank Plc. and the “Nemzeti 
Kutatási Fejlesztési és Innovációs Hivatal” (National 
Research, Development and Innovation Office).  
State owned venture capital fund managements manage 
only state owned funds. Their expected returns are 
lower than those of the privately-owned capital fund 
managers, but investment decisions and processes are 
much more controlled. Therefore, the decision-making 
process is longer, which is also apparent during the 
cooperation phase with the target company after the 
investment. 
 
Comparison of the characteristics of the private and 
the state venture capital 
The investment structure of the state venture capital 
investors materially differs from those of the private 
venture capital investor companies. Venture capital fund 
management invests into equity. In the investment 
contracts, they define exit opportunities, the practice of 
ownership rights, voting rights, the decisional scopes of 
stakeholders, and the right to delegate members into 
distinct positions and boards (supervisory board 
members, board of directors, the person of the CEO, 
etc.) To identify the differences let us examine the 
characteristics of the private venture investment deals 
first.  
The private venture fund managers concentrate on 
getting as big ownership stake as possible. If the target 
company becomes more valuable, then investors can 
realize substantial returns by the exit. The private 
investors focus on getting a majority share in the target 
companies to get control rights. They like to emphasize 
that they are strategic investors and partners with 
business network, market know-how. They also usually 
insist on including in the contract the so-called drag-
along right, which obligates the founders to sell their 
shares together if the venture capitalist could set up an 
exit. 
As opposed to that, state venture capital investors are 
typically financial investors: they do not wish to 
intervene into the everyday operation. They do not 
necessarily acquire a majority share in the target 
companies, their share usually remains under 49%. 
Thus, they leave the leadership in the hands of the 
original founders. Furthermore, state venture capital 
investors limit their profit potential on individual 
investments. The exit plan is that the target company 
will repurchase the fund’s share at the exit with a 
defined fixed expected rate of return. Capital 
investments are often combined with an ownership loan 
with continuous amortization to the exit. This can be 
considered as a risk mitigation step, which transforms 
state capital investments similar to hybrid financing. By 
these loans of course a lower interest is charged than the 
level of expected return on the equity. 
State involvement creates the opportunity that the 
successfully developed enterprise could stay in the 
possession and control of the original founders and will 
not be sold necessarily to third (mainly foreign) 
investors.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Seed companies are in a difficult position in terms of 
financing. State intervention intends to solve this kind 
of market failure by providing state and EU funds. 
Distribution and utilization of EU funds are controlled 
by the state. On the Hungarian venture capital market 
two models of state intervention have been developed. 
The first form of state involvement is the indirect, when 
the state and the private sector cooperate. In that case, 
private venture capitalists manage funds containing state 
and EU sources, and the private venture capitalist 
attitude is dominating the investment process. The 
second form of state involvement is the direct 
intervention, when the state-owned venture fund 
managers directly control and monitor the investment 
process until the exit. Target companies can decide 
whether they need an active partner with higher return 
expectation or they would like to run their business 
alone beside a lower expected return from the financing 
partner.  
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